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OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________
Huyett, District Judge:
The
U.S.C.

§§

Black

901-945,

Lung

Benefits

establishes

Act
a

("BLBA"

or

comprehensive

"Act"),

30

scheme

to

compensate coal miners and their surviving dependents for medical
problems and disabilities caused by pneumoconiosis, also known as
black lung disease.

30 U.S.C. § 901(a); BethEnergy Mines, Inc.

v. Director, OWCP, 32 F.3d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).

Pursuant to

section 422(g) of the Act, 30 U.S.C. § 932(g), the amount of
benefits payable must be reduced by the amount of compensation

received

under

a

federal

or

state

workers'

compensation

law

because of death or disability caused by pneumoconiosis.
In

the

matter

before

us,

we

are

presented

with

a

conflict between the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs ("Director") of the Department of Labor ("DOL"), and the
Benefits

Review

provision.
determined

Board

Rejecting
that

("Board")
the

employers

of

DOL

Director's

paying

over

this

position,

federal

black

offset

the

lung

Board

benefits

should offset their payments by the amount of state benefits the
miners received from the Commonwealth pursuant to section 301(i)
of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act.

We must decide

whether to defer to the Director's policy that compensation from
Pennsylvania general revenues pursuant to section 301(i) of the
Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act does not reduce the miner's
entitlement to federal benefits.
Board's

conclusion

that

Although we disagree with the

Congress's

intent

is

clear

from

the

statute, we conclude that the Director's interpretation of the
pertinent

federal

inconsistent

with

regulations
the

is

regulations.

plainly

erroneous

We

the

deny

and

Director's

petition for review.
I.
A.

Regulatory Structure

Federal Black Lung Benefits Program
Prior cases have reviewed the legislative history of

the Black Lung Benefits Act.

See, e.g., Elliot Coal Mining Co.

v. Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616, 627-28 (3d Cir. 1994); Helen
Mining Co. v. Director, OWCP, 924 F.2d 1269, 1271-73 (3d Cir.
1991).

We set forth only those portions that are essential to an

understanding of this case.

Originally promulgated in 1969 as

part of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub.
L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792 (1969) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901945), Congress has amended the Black Lung Benefits Act several
times.

See, e.g., Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.

92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972); Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978); Black Lung Benefits
Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981) (all
codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945).
Claims for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act
are either "Part B," "transition period," or "Part C" claims.
Part B governs all claims filed before June 30, 1973.
U.S.C. §§ 921-925.

See 30

Part B claims were filed with and adjudicated

by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Social Security
Administration ("SSA").

Claims that were filed from July 1, 1973

through December 31, 1973 are "transition period" claims.
U.S.C.

§

facilitate

925.1
the

Congress
transfer

created
of

the

the

transition

primary

period

30
to

responsibility

for

processing and adjudicating claims from the SSA to the DOL.

The

federal treasury was responsible to pay benefits until January 1,
1974.

30 U.S.C. § 925(a).

At that time, coal mine operators who

had been notified of pending black lung claims were to assume
liability for the payment of benefits.

30 U.S.C. § 925.

Part C, 30 U.S.C. §§ 932-945, which governs all claims
filed after January 1, 1974, applies to the matter before us.
1

.

Technically, these claims are considered Part B claims.

Although DOL administers these claims, Part C establishes an
employer-funded

federal

workers'

compensation

program

in

cooperation with the states to provide benefits to coal mine
workers for total disability or death due to pneumoconiosis.

A

coal tax funded Black Lung Disability Trust Fund ("Fund") pays
interim benefits when a designated responsible coal mine operator
fails to commence payment within thirty days after the initial
determination of eligibility by the deputy commissioner.

26

U.S.C.

an

§

9501(d)(1);

20

C.F.R.

§

725.522(b).

If

administrative law judge, the Board, or a court later determines
that the recipient was entitled to the amount paid from the Fund
and that the operator was liable, the responsible operator must
repay the Fund.

30 U.S.C. § 934(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 725.602.

Congress designed section 422(g) of the BLBA to prevent
Part C claimants from receiving duplicative black lung benefits.
Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1526 (3d
Cir. 1992).

Section 422(g) provides in pertinent part:
The amount of benefits payable under
this section shall be reduced, on a monthly
or other appropriate basis, by the amount of
any compensation received under or pursuant
to
any
Federal
or
State
workmen's
compensation
law
because
of
death
or
disability due to pneumoconiosis.

30 U.S.C. § 932(g).
double

recovery

in

A provision is also designed to prevent
Part

B

claims.

Although

not

directly

applicable to the matter before us, it is useful to compare it
with section 422(g). Section 412(b) reads in pertinent part:
[B]enefit payments under this section to a
miner, or his widow, child, parent, brother,
or sister shall be reduced, on a monthly or

other appropriate basis, by an amount equal
to any payment received by such miner or his
widow, child, parent, brother, or sister
under
the
workmen's
compensation,
unemployment
compensation,
or
disability
insurance laws of his State on account of the
disability
of
such
miner
due
to
pneumoconiosis, and the amount by which such
payments would be reduced on account of
excess earnings of such miner under section
203(b) through (l) of the Social Security
Act, if the amount paid were a benefit
payable under section 202 of such Act.
30 U.S.C. § 922(a).
B.

Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act
In the two cases consolidated before the Board, miners

George

O'Brockta

and

Benjamin

Stinner

both

received

benefits

pursuant to the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, 77 Pa.
Cons.
Section

Stat.

Ann.

301(i)

of

§§

1201-1603,

because

the

Pennsylvania

of

pneumoconiosis.

Occupational

Disease

Act,

states in pertinent part as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
act, compensation for silicosis, anthracosilicosis, coal worker's pneumoconiosis, and
asbestosis shall be paid for each month
beginning with the month this amending act
becomes effective, or beginning with the
first month of disability, whichever occurs
later, at the rate of seventy-five dollars
($75) per month, to every employe totally
disabled thereby as a result of exposure
thereto,
who
has
not
theretofore
been
compensated because his claim was barred by
any of the time limitations prescribed by
this act, and shall continue during the
period of such total disability.
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1401(i).
The source of the compensation depends on the miner's situation.
Generally,

Pennsylvania

pays

forty

percent

of

the

liability

imposed under the Occupational Disease Act and a responsible
employer pays sixty percent.

77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1408(a).

The Commonwealth, however, pays all compensation if it is not
conclusively proven that the miner's disability arose out of
employment with his last employer, 77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
1401(g), or if a miner's last exposure preceded December 1, 1965,
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1401(i).
benefits

pursuant

requires

the

revenues

of

to

state
the

to

the

federal

suspend

Commonwealth.2

When a claimant receives
statute,

compensation
77

Pa.

Pennsylvania
from

Cons.

the

Stat.

law

general
Ann.

§

1401(k).
2

. The pertinent part of the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease
Act reads as follows:
Upon the award of any benefits under the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 to a person who
is also receiving or claiming monthly compensation
totally funded by general revenues of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania under subsections (a), (i), (j) or (l)
of section 301, such person shall have his monthly
compensation from general revenues of the Commonwealth
suspended effective with the month following the month
of award of Federal benefits . . . . Upon any future
action by the United States Congress, Federal executive
departments, or Federal courts which would make present
recipients under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease
Act eligible for both Federal and State payments, the
sum of which would exceed the maximum authorized
Federal payment, the eligible recipients would then
receive retroactively all State payments that were
suspended under the authority of this act. All such
recipients who have their State payments suspended
shall continue their eligibility and entitlement under
the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act and at any
time in the future for whatever reason that such
recipients' payments under the Federal law are
terminated, suspended or reduced their State payments
shall be reinstituted effective with the month
following the month that Federal benefits are
terminated, suspended or reduced.

II.

Facts and Procedural History

We review two cases consolidated before the Benefits
Review Board on appeal.

George O'Brockta ("O'Brockta") filed an

application for federal black lung benefits on December 2, 1976.
See J.A. at 64 (ALJ Decision and Order - Award of Benefits, Dec.
9,

1983).

Respondent

Eastern

Associated

Coal

Corporation

("Eastern") controverted its designation as responsible operator,
and the DOL initiated the payment of interim benefits from the
Fund.
of

While this application was pending, a Pennsylvania Bureau

Workers'

Compensation

Referee

directed

the

Pennsylvania

Department of Labor and Industry to compensate O'Brockta at the
rate of $125.00 per month beginning July 9, 1979, pursuant to
section

301(i)

of

the

Pennsylvania

Occupational

Disease

J.A. at 73-74 (Referee's Decision, Jan. 11, 1980).

Act.

O'Brockta

eventually collected $1,750.00 from Pennsylvania for the period
July 9, 1979 to September 23, 1980.

Pursuant to a West Virginia

occupational disease act, he collected $10,756.73 for the period
November 21, 1976 to June 4, 1978.
O'Brockta's widow later filed a survivor's claim on
September 24, 1980.

An administrative law judge ordered Eastern

to pay Mrs. O'Brockta for benefits to which she was entitled
commencing in December 1976.
Awarding

Benefits,

Feb.

J.A. at 54 (Decision and Order -25,

1986).

On

a

motion

for

reconsideration, the administrative law judge ordered Eastern to
(..continued)
77 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1401(k).

"reimburse the Secretary of Labor for any payments made to the
claimant

less

compensation
appropriate,
O'Brockta.

the

appropriate

benefits"
from

the

and

offsets

to

amounts

for

deduct

it

was

state

such

workmen's

amounts,

required

to

pay

as
Mrs.

J.A. at 51-53 (Order Granting Employer's Motion for

Reconsideration
Benefits,

and

April

Amending

3,

the

1986).

Decision

The

and

Order

administrative

Awarding

law

judge

considering the Director's Motion for Reconsideration rejected
the Director's argument that although the award properly offset
payments made pursuant to the West Virginia statute, payments
derived from Pennsylvania general revenues were not pursuant to a
workers' compensation law.

J.A. at 46-49 (Order Denying Motion

for Clarification, May 19, 1988).
Benjamin
benefits

Stinner

pursuant

to

("Stinner")

section

301(i)

filed
of

his
the

Occupational Disease Act on September 27, 1978.

claim

for

Pennsylvania
On October 4,

1979, a state referee directed the Pennsylvania Department of
Labor and Industry to pay him $125 per month commencing August 3,
1979.

J.A. at 76-78 (Referee's Decision, Oct. 4, 1979).

eventually

received

$2000

pursuant

to

this

program.

He
He

subsequently filed for benefits pursuant to the BLBA on January
9, 1980.

After designated responsible operator Underkoffler Coal

Service ("Underkoffler") refused to pay benefits to Stinner, DOL
initiated interim payments from the Fund on April 8, 1981.

On

December 9, 1983, pursuant to the BLBA, an administrative law
judge ordered benefits to commence as of January 1980.

J.A. at

64-72 (Decision and Order - Award of Benefits, Dec. 9, 1983).

Underkoffler

repaid

the

Department

of

Labor

for

the

interim

benefits except $2000, the amount of benefits Stinner received
pursuant to the Pennsylvania program.

The administrative law

judge considering this issue refused to order Underkoffler to
repay this money.

J.A. at 39-42 (Decision and Order - Denying

Additional Reimbursement of Medical Benefits, June 27, 1988).
These two cases were consolidated for appeal to the Board.
On appeal, the Board rejected the Director's contention
that

payments

made

to

O'Brockta

and

Stinner

pursuant

to the

Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act did not reduce the amount
of federal benefits that responsible operators must reimburse the
Fund.

The Board found the statutory language of section 422(g)

clear and unambiguous, and it refused to consider the legislative
history as an aid to its construction of the statute.

J.A. at

17-25 (Decision and Order of the Benefits Review Board, March 22,
1994).
The
jurisdiction

Director
over

this

now

petitions

appeal

from

for
the

review.
final

order

We
of

have
the

Benefits Review Board pursuant to section 422(a) of the Black
Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), which incorporates section
21(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 921(c).3
3

. The Supreme Court recently considered the Director's standing
to pursue appeals in Director, OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___ S. Ct. ____, ___ L. Ed.2d ___,
No. 93-1783, 1995 WL 115726 (March 21, 1995). The Supreme Court
held that the Director does not have standing to sue pursuant to
§ 921(c) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 921(c), to seek judicial review of decisions by the
Benefits Review Board that in the Director's view, deny claimants

III.
A.

Discussion

Standard of Review
When we review the decisions of the Board for error of

law, our review is plenary.

Director, OWCP v. Barnes & Tucker

Co., 969 F.2d 1524, 1527 (3d Cir. 1992); Hillibush v. United
States Dep't of Labor, Benefits Review Bd., 853 F.2d 197, 202 (3d
Cir. 1988).

The principals of deference articulated in Chevron,

U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
104 S. Ct. 2278, 81 L. Ed.2d 694 (1984), however, guide our
construction of the BLBA.

See also Elliot Coal Mining Co. v.

Director, OWCP, 17 F.3d 616 (3d Cir. 1994).
When we review an agency's construction of a statute,
if the intent of Congress is clear, we must give effect to that
intent.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.

If

the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular
issue, then we must defer to the agency's regulation if it is
based on a reasonable construction of the statute.

Id.

When

(..continued)
compensation to which they are entitled. This decision does not
affect this appeal, however, because Congress explicitly
designated the Secretary of Labor as a party in any proceeding
relative to a claim for black lung benefits. 30 U.S.C. § 932(k).
See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Furthermore, the Board
decision adversely affected DOL's ability to recover payments
from the Fund and thus implicates the Director's pecuniary
interest, making him an aggrieved party under the teachings of
Krolick Contracting Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 558 F.2d 685,
689 (3d Cir. 1977), and its progeny. See Director, OWCP v.
Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 678 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1982);
accord Director, OWCP v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 560 F.2d 710,
716-17 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Newport News Shipbuilding, 1995 WL
115726 at *2 n.1 (noting that the issue of the Director's
standing as administrator of a LHWCA Fund was not before the
court).

considering

whether

the

regulation

complies

with

Congress's

mandate:
[W]e look to see whether the regulation
harmonizes with the plain language of the
statute, its origin, and its purpose. . . .
So long as the regulation bears a fair
relationship to the language of the statute,
reflects the views of those who sought its
enactment, and matches the purpose they
articulated, it will merit deference.
Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994).
We

must

interpretation

of

also
its

"defer

own

to

regulation

an

agency's

unless

it

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'"

consistent
is

'plainly

Director, OWCP

v. Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1323 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S. Ct. 1215,
1217, 89 L. Ed. 1700 (1945)); Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d at 453.
accord

greater

deference

to

an

administrative

We

agency's

interpretation of its own regulations than to its interpretation
of a statute.

Facciano Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of

Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
114 S. Ct. 80, 126 L. Ed.2d 48 (1993).

See also Martin v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 150,
111 S. Ct. 1171, 1175, 113 L. Ed.2d 117 (1991); Lyng v. Payne,
476 U.S. 926, 939, 106 S. Ct. 2333, 2341, 90 L. Ed.2d 921 (1986)
("an agency's construction of its own regulations is entitled to
substantial
permit

us

deference").
to

defer

to

This
an

deference,

"interpretation

however,
in

an

does

not

adversary

proceeding that strains the plain and natural meaning of the
words."

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health

Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1978); Mangifest, 826
F.2d at 1324. As we have said before:
The responsibility to promulgate clear and
unambiguous standards is upon the Secretary.
The test is not what he might possibly have
intended, but what he said. If the language
is faulty, the Secretary has the means and
the obligation to amend.
Bethlehem Steel v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d at 161.

Thus, any deference

also is "tempered by our duty to independently insure that the
agency's

interpretation

adopted."
1989).

comports

with

the

language

it

has

Director, OWCP v. Gardner, 882 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir.

See also Sekula v. FDIC, 39 F.3d at 453; Barnes & Tucker

Co., 969 F.2d at 1527.
In

addition,

we

give

judicial

deference

to

the

Director, as policymaker, rather than to the Board, which is
purely an adjudicator.

Elliot Coal Mining Co., 17 F.3d at 626-

27; Barnes & Tucker Co., 969 F.2d at 1527; Gardner, 883 F.2d at
70.

When the Director and the Secretary advance conflicting

interpretations of the statute, the Secretary's interpretation
prevails

over

the

Director's

delegatee of the Secretary.
627.

because

the

Director

is

a

mere

Elliot Coal Mining Co., 17 F.3d at

As a result, when a regulation is clear on its face, the

regulation may not be subject to an alternative construction by
the Director.
B.

Gardner, 882 F.2d at 68.

Interpretation of the Regulations
We

ambiguous.

agree

with

the

Director

that

the

statute

is

The statute requires an offset "by the amount of any

compensation received under or pursuant to any Federal or State

workmen's compensation law because of death or disability due to
pneumoconiosis."

30 U.S.C. § 932(g).

Congress's intent as to

the meaning of "workers' compensation law" is not clear from the
text of the statute alone.

The statute fails to define the

meaning of worker's compensation, nor is its meaning apparent
from the text.
"workmen's

As did the Board, we consider the definition of

compensation"

as

provided

in

Larson's

Workmen's

Compensation. It defines workmen's compensation as follows:
Workmen's
compensation
is
a
mechanism
providing cash-wage benefits and medical care
to victims of work-connected injuries, and
for placing the cost of these injuries
ultimately on the consumer, through the
medium of insurance, whose premiums are
passed on in the cost of the product.
1

Arthur

(1994).
section
places

Larson,

The

Law

of

Workmen's

Compensation,

§

1.00

The Director points out that in certain situations,
301(i)
the

of

cost

the

on

Pennsylvania

the

public

Occupational

fisc,

rather

Disease

than

by

Act

using

insurance, and that the amount of the Pennsylvania payments bear
no relation to the miner's wages.

We agree that the text of the

statute is ambiguous with respect to whether section 301(i) of
the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act was excluded from the
term "workman's compensation laws."

Therefore, the Board erred

in concluding that the text was clear, and we must consider
whether

the

Secretary's

regulation

and

the

Director's

The

regulation

interpretation comport with the statute.
We

consider

two

regulations.

implementing section 422(g) states as follows:

With respect to any benefits payable for all
periods of eligibility after January 1, 1974,
a reduction of the amount of benefits payable
shall be required on account of:
(1)
Any compensation or benefits
received
under
any
State
workers'
compensation law because of death or partial
or total disability due to pneumoconiosis . .
. .
20 C.F.R. § 725.533(a)(1).

The regulations define a "workers'

compensation law" for the purposes of Part C as follows:
For the purposes of this subchapter, except
where
the
content
clearly
indicates
otherwise, the following definitions apply: .
. . (4) A "workers' compensation law" means a
law providing for payment of benefits to
employees,
and
their
dependents
and
survivors, for disability on account of
injury, including occupational disease, or
death, suffered in connection with their
employment.
20 C.F.R. § 725.101(a)(4) (emphasis added).

These regulations

comport with the language of the statute and with Congress's
apparent intent.

The regulations fail to suggest that when a law

authorizes benefits to employees solely from general revenues, it
is not a workers' compensation statute.

In fact, the text of the

regulation does not suggest that the source of funding of the law
plays any role in its determination as a workers' compensation
law.
The Director, however, argues that we should defer to
her

interpretation

that

the

phrase

"payment

of

benefits

to

employees" actually means "payment of benefits by employers to
employees."
the

She offers several reasons for her interpretation of

regulation.

First,

a

now

repealed

regulation

defined

"workers' compensation law" exactly as the Director seeks to
interpret the current regulation.

The Director argues that prior

to 1978, Part C regulations defined "workmen's compensation law"
as follows:
A "workmen's compensation law" means a law
providing for payment of compensation by
employers to employees (and their dependents)
for injury (including occupational disease),
or death suffered in connection with their
employment.
20 C.F.R. § 715.101(a)(18) (1977) (repealed) (emphasis added).
The Director argues that Congress never amended the statute to
change the definition of "workers' compensation law" and that
there is no record that the Director intended to change her
policy of not reducing federal black lung benefits by the amount
of

compensation

received

solely

revenues under section 301(i).

from

Pennsylvania

general

The issue however, is what the

Secretary said through regulation, not what the Secretary might
have intended.
(3d

Cir.

provides

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 573 F.2d 157, 161

1978).
further

Thus,
proof

if
that

anything,
the

this

current

older

regulation

regulations

do

not

exclude laws that provide for payments from a state's general
revenues from the definition of "workers' compensation laws."
Regulations in Part B provide further support that the Director's
interpretation of the regulations is inconsistent with the text
of

the

regulation.

"workmen's

compensation

Part
law"

B

regulations
to

exclude

explicitly
statutes

define

funded

general revenues. Section 410.110(p) provides as follows:
A "workmen's compensation law" means a
law providing for payment of compensation to

by

an employee (and his dependents) for injury
(including occupational disease) or death
suffered in connection with his employment.
A payment funded wholly out of general
revenues
and
paid
(without
regard
to
insurance principles) solely on account of
the financial need of the miner and his
family, shall not be considered a payment
under a "workmen's compensation law."
20 C.F.R. § 410.110(p) (emphasis added).

Although the Director

argues that DOL looked to the SSA's interpretation of the BLBA in
writing the regulations, the SSA regulations are much different
than

the

DOL

regulations.

This

regulation

reinforces

the

impression that the Director must comply with the text of the
regulation rather than with what the Secretary may have intended
section 725.101(a)(4) to mean.
Second,

the

Director

argues

that

if

the

words

"to

employees" are read without inferring the words "by employers"
the word "to employees" loses its specific meaning and the more
general

word

"individuals"

Director's Br. at 29.

could

be

substituted

instead.

This interpretation in not evident from

the text of the regulation.

The BLBA only provides benefits to

injured employees and their dependents.

Some other "individual"

who receives compensation pursuant to some state statute, would
never be seeking benefits pursuant to the BLBA.

The Director's

interpretation adds words that are not in the text and are not
evident from a plain and natural reading of the statute.
Third, the Director argues that the Board's decision
confers a windfall on the employers.

We agree with the Director

that pursuant to the Board's decision, the Respondents' total

liability is less than it would have been had there been no state
award.

This policy concern, however, is one the Secretary must

address through rewriting the regulations rather than through
interpretation.
Finally, the Director argues that the "the Black Lung
Benefits Act is remedial legislation that ought to be liberally
construed, so long as such a construction would not be plainly
erroneous

or

inconsistent

Director's Br. at 31.
inconsistent

with

the

with

the

language

of

the

Act."

While the Director's interpretation is not
statute,

it

is

inconsistent

with

the

statute's implementing regulations, even according substantial
deference to the Director.

Therefore, we cannot defer to this

interpretation.
Although the Director claims that she consistently has
applied the same policy for twenty years, she is not permitted to
imply language that simply does not exist.

Director, OWCP v.

Mangifest, 826 F.2d 1318, 1324 (3d Cir. 1987).

Absent from the

text of the regulation is any suggestion that the funding source
of

a

state

statute

compensation statute.

determines

consideration

status

as

a

workers'

Her interpretation strains the "plain and

natural meaning" of the text.
require

its

of

To reach such a result would

factors

far

beyond

the

actual

regulation.
On the other hand, we also reject the Board's argument
that we must accord deference to Pennsylvania's interpretation of
section 422(g) of the BLBA.

We defer only to the interpretations

offered by the agency charged with administering the law.

Thus,

the

fact

that

section

301

of

the

Pennsylvania

Occupational

Disease Act is in Title 77, entitled "Workmen's Compensation,"
does not influence our decision, nor does the fact that the
referee

who

awarded

O'Brockta

and

Stinner

benefits

was

a

Workmen's Compensation Referee for the Commonwealth's Bureau of
Workers' Compensation.

To hold otherwise would permit the state,

rather than the federal government to administer the laws.

Thus,

we must reject the Board's reasoning that the plain meaning of
section 422(g) is that when a state has denominated a law as a
workers'

compensation

subject to offset.

law,

benefits

paid

pursuant

to

it

are

We reiterate that we cannot accord more

deference to the Director's interpretation of the regulation than
to the actual regulation.
The

Director

points

to

a

single

segment

of

the

legislative history that support her interpretation, but we find
her reference unhelpful.4
4

Congress delegated the Secretary the

. During floor debate in 1969, Representative Dent, congressman
from Pennsylvania who was the floor manager of the Bill, stated
that the offset provisions of §§ 412(b) and 422(g) did not apply
to state programs funded through general revenues. He cited the
Pennsylvania program that paid benefits out of general revenues
as an example of a program that was not a "workmen's
compensation" program within the meaning of the Act. 115 Cong.
Rec. 39713 (1969). This isolated floor comment would have
provided some support for the Director's position had the
Secretary interpreted the provisions of the Act relating to Part
C in the same manner as the Social Security Administration
interpreted the provisions relating to Part B when it promulgated
§ 410.110(p) of its regulations. However, the Secretary, whom we
believe from the context must have been acting advertently,
adopted a regulation regarding Part C claims with a text markedly
different from the text of § 410.110(p). Congressman Dent's
comment would not justify our reading the Secretary's regulation
concerning Part C claims in a manner inconsistent with its text.

responsibility to fill in the gaps left in the BLBA.

If DOL

intends to make an exception for state statutes that are funded
solely through a state's general revenues, it has the means and
obligation

to

amend

its

regulations

to

provide

for

this

exception.

The Director's interpretation does not comport with

the language of the regulations.

IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, we hold that the agency's regulations
defining workmen's or workers' compensation laws are a reasonable
construction of the statute, the regulations are not ambiguous,
and

the

Director's

interpretation

of

the

regulations

are

inconsistent with the regulation, therefore, we do not defer to
the Director's interpretation.

Although we disagree with the

Board

is

that

Congress's

intent

plain

from

the

statutory

language, we hold that because the Director's interpretation of
the

regulations

are

inconsistent

with

the

Secretary's

regulations, the Board's order should be affirmed.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for
review and affirm the order of the Benefits Review Board.

